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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL 
PETITION IN REGIONAL AND GLOBAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS PROTECTION MECHANISMS 
This article assesses the position of the individual as a participant in the 
international legal process by reference to the individual petition mechanisms of the 
main regional (European, American, and African) and global (United Nations 
treaty-based and Charter-based) human rights systems. A review of historical 
examples of individual petition procedures in the first part of this article will reveal 
their previously exceptional and state-centred nature. Examination of the modern 
human rights systems in terms of institutional structure, access, available remedies, 
compliance and overall effectiveness will make it possible to determine whether the 
position of the individual has changed conceptually and practically in international 
law. Although the individual petition mechanisms of the modem human rights 
systems all suffer from shortcomings, their difference from historical examples and 
their continued growth confirms the individual as a rights-bearing subject of 
international law. 
Traditionally, individuals have only rarely been able to bring international claims in 
their own name against states. The involvement of individuals in the international 
dispute settlement process was generally limited to the exercise of diplomatic 
protection by states in respect of ill-treatment of their nationals by other states. The 
individual was effectively regarded as the 'property' of hisiher state,' which state 
was permitted at its discretion to sue another state for injuring However, 
the establishment of mechanisms permitting individuals to hold states accountable 
internationally was not entirely unheard of. In the time of the Holy Roman Empire 
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' 'By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international "judicial" 
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights - its rights to ensure, in the person of its 
subjects, respect for the rules of international law': Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v UK) (Judgment) 
[I9241 PCIJ (ser A) No 2, 12; See also Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Estonia v Lithuania) (Merits) [I9391 PCIJ 
(ser. Am) No 76, 16; Repeated in Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (Second Phase) [I9551 ICJ Rep 4,24; 
Reaffirmed in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) ICJ Rep 
para 78: 'for it is its own right that the State is asserting'. 
'Thestate must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is 
granted, and when it will cease. It remains in this respect a discretionary power the exercise of which may be 
determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case': Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) ICJ Rep 79. 
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- the modern state-system's gestation period - individuals could bring grievances 
against princes to the attention of the pope.) Those early systems will be examined 
in order to underline their differences from the present human rights bodies. 
A Central American Court of Justice (CACJ) 
The first international court able to receive complaints from individuals in their own 
right4 was the CACJ, established in 1907 as part of a plan to create and maintain 
peace between five Central American states with a long history of violence? The 
CACJ was established to 'decide every difference or difficulty that may arise 
amongst them, of whatsoever nature it may bey6 and was obliged to hear cases 
brought by individuals of one state against the government of an~ the r .~  None of the 
five cases brought by individuals to the CACJ suc~eeded.~ Of those five cases, four 
could be said to be of a human rights character. Two failed on grounds of non- 
exhaustion of local remedies, even though these remedies were useless or 
impossible to e~haus t .~  In the other two cases the CACJ held that there was 
insufficient proof of the allegations or that the claim was without foundation. lo  
L Ali Khan, The Extinction of Nation-States: a World without Borders (1996) 16. For an examination of the 
similarities between the roles of the Pope and the Emperor and those of international tribunals see FH Hinsley, 
Sovereignty (2nd ed, 1 986) 1 7 1. 
There already existed 'mixed claims commissions' for use in disputes between various Latin American states 
(Mexico and Venezuela in particular) and the major powers (USA, Britain, and Germany in particular). However, 
although these commissions were designed to settle disputes of private origin, claims had to be brought in the name 
of a State, and were expressly in the exercise of diplomatic protection. See W. Paul Gormley, The Procedural 
Status of the Individual Before International and Supranational Tribunals (1966) 36-37. 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador convened in 1907 to conclude a General Treaty of 
Peace and Amity and a Convention for the Establishment of the Central American Court of Justice. The texts of 
these documents are reprinted in 'Treaty and Conventions of the Central American Peace Conference' (1908) 2 
American Journal oflnternational Law (Supplement) 219,23 1 <http://www.heinonline.org> at 2 September 2003. 
For more information see Ramirez, Cinco Aiios de la Corte De Justicia Centroamericana (1918). 
Convention for the Establishment of the Central American Court of Justice art 1;  similar wording is found in article 
1 of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity. 
Convention for the Establishment of the Central American Court of Justice art 2. 
The Court, which was to apply 'principles of international law' (Convention for the Establishment of the Central 
American Court of Justice art 1 I), considered that 'the fundamental rights and powers of the human individual in 
civil life are placed under the protection of the principles governing the commonwealth of nations, as international 
rights of man': Dr. Pedro Andres Fornos Diaz v The Government of the Republic of Guatemala, CACJ, March 6 
1909, in 'Decisions Involving Questions of International Law' (1909) 3 American Journal of International Law 737, 
743. The four cases of a human rights character dealt with: 
a) allegations of false arrest and imprisonment: Dr. Pedro Andres Fornos Diaz v. The Government of the 
Republic of Guatemala, CACJ, 6 March 1909 (the Diaz Case); 
b) unlawful conditions of detention, interference with private possessions and correspondence and 
expulsion: Felipe Molina Larios v Honduras, CAC J, 10 December 19 1 3 (the Larios case). The 
complainant also alleged unlawful imprisonment; 
c) denial of enjoyment of equal civil rights to nationals of a contracting state: Salvador Cerda v Costa Rica, 
CACJ, 14 October 191 1 (the Cerda case) (under the General Treaty of Peace andAmity, the contracting 
parties were obliged to ensure that citizens of other contracting parties enjoyed 'the same civil rights as 
are enjoyed by nationals': art 6); 
d) expulsion and denial of equal rights to the citizen of a contracting party: Alejandro Bermudez Nuiiez v 
Costa Rica, CACJ, 7 April 1914 (the Nunez case). 
For summaries of all the cases brought by individuals heard by the Court, see Manley 0 Hudson, 'The Central 
American Court of Justice' (1932) 26 American Joumal oflnternational Law 759,770. 
See the discussion of the Diaz case and the Larios case in Manley 0 Hudson, 'The Central American Court of 
Justice' (1932) 26 American Journal oflnternational Law 759. In the Diaz case the Court said that it could not 
accept such an argument because it would amount to defamation of Guatemala. In the Larios case the Court made 
its decision despite the fact that the complainant was not allowed back into Honduras to pursue any remedies. 
'O See the discussion of the Cerda case and the Nufiez case in Manley 0 Hudson, 'The Central American Court of 
Justice' (1932) 26 American Journal of International Law 759. 
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B Post World War One Agreements 
The peace treaties at the end of World War One created three notable mechanisms 
allowing individual petition: the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, the Minority Protection 
System, and the Mandate System. First, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals in the main 
permitted nationals of the Allied Powers to claim against governments of enemy 
states" for losses of an economic character suffered during the conflict.12 Second, 
the Minority Protection System was established though a series of multilateral13 and 
bilateral14 arrangements imposed on (in the main) the defeated states to protect 
minorities within their borders. These were ultimately supervised by the Council of 
the League of Nations which established an individual petition procedure.15 
However, the individual was regarded merely as a source of information and did not 
participate in the procedure.16 Petitions were handled in practice through informal 
and confidential meetings between the Minorities Section of the League of Nations 
and the offending state.17 Occasionally cases moved to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice for advisory opinions, or as contentious cases. However, 
petitioners were also without a role in these proceedings.18 Third, the Mandate 
System was established by the League of Nations Covenant essentially to supervise 
the colonial possessions of the defeated states after World War One. A Mandate 
Commission was established to act upon individual petitions regarding misconduct 
by the mandatory state.19 As with the Minority Protection System, the individual 
was regarded merely as a source of information and could not be heard officially by 
' I  Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey. 
I' For the text of the relevant articles of the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain. Neuilly, Trianon and Lausanne, see 
Paul F Simonson, Private Property and Rights in Enemy Countries 280-289, cited in Carl Aage Nlirrgaard, The 
Position of the Individual in International Law (1962) 230. Similar arrangements were made after World War 11. 
The Supreme Court of Restitution was established in 1952 pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement of Matters 
Arising out of the War and Occupation: see Carl Aage Narrgaard, The Position ofthe Individual in International Law 
(1962) 242. This Convention was concluded between the United States, the United Kingdom and France on one 
side and Germany on the other. 
l 3  Special clauses were inserted into the Peace Treaties of Versailles, Neuilly, St. Germain and Trianon, obliging 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia to protect minorities within their borders: see League of 
Nations Oficial Journal (1 925), 950 and Proc2s-Verbal of the Sh session of the Council (1920) 25, 19 1, cited in 
Carl Aage Narrgaard, The Position of the Individual in International Law (1962) 120. 
l4 The Upper Silesian Convention (also known as the Geneva Convention) established a similar system between 
Germany and Poland: 9 LNTS, arts 562-606. 
15 c Special Supplement: Documents Relating to the Protection of Minorities, League of Nations' (also known as the 
'Tittoni Report'), (1929) No 73 League of Nations OfJicial Journal 20,5 1. 
l6  The system was designed 'to avoid at all costs an arrangement under which the state concerned and the petitioning 
minority would appear before the Council as parties in a trial': P de Azcarte, League of Nations and National 
Minorities. An Experiment (1 945) 104. 
65% of cases were handled by the Minority Section in this way: see Joost Herman, The League of Nations and its 
Minority Protection Programme in Eastern Europe: Revolutionavy, Unequalled and Underestimated, in The League 
OfNations, 1920-1946 : Organisation And Accomplishments : A Retrospective Of The First Organisation For The 
Establishment Of World Peace (1996) 49,53. 
l 8  Covenant of the League ofNations (1919) arts 36,37,65; Statute of the Permanent Court oflnternational Justice 
(1920) . See also Carl Aage Narrgaard, The Position of the Individual in International Law (1962) 112. There were 
a handful of PCIJ advisory opinions delivered, referred to the Court both by the Council under the League system 
and Germany and Poland under the bilateral system. 
l9  Covenant of the League ofNations (1919) arts 22,22(9). Article 22 (1) states that mandatory states are 
responsible for the 'well-being and development' of their trust territories. 
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the f om mission.^^ The Mandatory state was present at the petition's 
c~nsideration.~~ 
The overriding consideration in establishing these procedures was the regulation of 
relations between states, rather than granting individuals the capacity to protect 
themselves at the international level. They were designed to deal with post-conflict 
situations, to redress past damage and to prevent future violence, and the role of the 
individual in these procedures was limited in accordance with those aims. This is 
seen most clearly in the fact that none of the procedures permitted individuals to sue 
their own state.22 Particular characteristics of each body also confinn this. The 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals for example were not generally open to nationals of 
defeated states.*) The CACJ interpreted its jurisdiction with regard to individual 
claims so narrowly that no such case ever succeeded. It is interesting to compare the 
approach of the CACJ to that of contemporary human rights bodies, which will not 
expect petitioners to exhaust ineffective local remedies,24 and require accused states 
to rebut plausible evidence rather than placing the burden of proof entirely on the 
victim.25 The CACJ based itself on the consideration that 'every limitation of [a 
state's] autonomy must be regarded "as an exceptional right and be construed in its 
narrowest sense, in the manner most suitable to the nation on which it has been 
imposed and causing the least detriment to its natural liberty"'.*6 
Individual petition appeared as an exceptional invasion of state sovereignty, 
secondary to the general aim of the treaty, which was to preserve inter-state peace. 
It was not seen as creating recourse for individual victims for its own sake, and as 
such there was no provision for individuals to sue their own state. The Minority and 
Mandate Systems merely regarded individuals as sources of information. Both 
systems served different political functions. The Minority System 'was merely one 
part of a larger system designed to facilitate the peaceful adjustment of political 
relations; hence, the guarantee of minority rights was envisaged as a political 
function'.27 The Mandate System was designed to 'legalize retrospectively the 
redistribution of ex-German and ex-Turkish dependencies agreed upon in secret 
" This changed with the creation of the Intemational Trusteeship System, established by article 75 of the Charter of 
the United Nations (1945), which replaced the existing Mandate System: see Rules ofProcedure of the Trusteeship 
Council, UN Doc TIlJRev. 6, r 79,80 and 77. 
" Carl Aage N~rgaard, The Position of the Individual in International Law (1 962) 124- 125. 
22 While an individual could complain of the behaviour of a mandatory in regard to his territory, these States were 
regarded as holding the territory in trust, and the populations thus not considered to be nationals: Covenant of the 
League of Nations (1 9 19) art 22. 
23 Though this was not universally the case: see Nsrgaard, above n 21,23 1. 
24 
'[Tlhe rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies.. . is based on the assumption.. . that there is an effective remedy 
available in respect of the alleged breach in the domestic system': Akdivar and others v Turkey (1996) vol IV Eur 
Court HR para 65. This approach is followed by all the regional bodies and treaty-bodies discussed below. There 
is no requirement for the exhaustion of local remedies in respect of procedures under the UN Charter. 
25 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Annual Report (2000-2001) UN Doc Al56140, vol I para 126: 'Under 
the Optional Protocol, the Committee bases its Views on all written information made available by the parties'. This 
implies that if a State party does not provide an answer to an author's allegations, the Committee will give due 
weight to an author's uncontested allegations as long as they are substantiated. 
26 The Central American Court of Justice, quoting Fiore's Cod$ed International Lmv, No. 150 in Dr. Pedro 
Andres Fornos Diaz v The Government of the Republic of Guatemala, CACJ, 6 March 1909 (the Diaz Case). 
27 Inis L Claude, National Minorities, An International Problem (1 969) 2 1. 
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treaties during World War 1'. 28 Nargaard's remark about the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunals can probably be extended to the other bodies discussed: 
However important [they]. . . were in the development of the position of the 
individual in international law, it cannot be denied that they were created as an 
exceptional means in an exceptional sit~ation.~' 
These limited exceptions to the exclusivity of the state in international dispute 
settlement were merely tools for regulating inter-state relations. Although 
individuals could press claims in their own right, rather than relying on the exercise 
of diplomatic protection, such mechanisms were only established to assist in 
maintaining peaceful relations between states. The mechanisms were not created for 
the sake of improving the situation of individuals in relation to states. 
The human rights bodies examined below differ significantly from the processes 
discussed above. They are the first mechanisms to allow individuals to bring an 
international claim against their own state or other states in whose jurisdiction they 
reside. They exist primarily to further the well-being of individuals, rather than to 
regulate inter-state relations, and in principle are not limited in life-span or subject 
matter to address a particular passing problem.30 
A Institutional Structure 
All the regional systems have had or will have both a commission and a court. The 
European Convention for the Protection of Human kghts and Fundamental 
Freedoms (the European convention)" was amended in 1998 by Protocol 1 1 .32 
This amendment abolished the European Commission, leaving the European Court 
of Human Rights (the European Court) as the sole adjudicatory body for the 
European system. The Inter-American system (the American system) possesses 
both a Commission and a Court in two overlapping systems under the Charter of the 
Organisation of American States (oAs))~ and the American Convention on Human 
Rights (the American  onv vent ion).^^ The African system also has both a 
commission and a court under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
28 George Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System, A Stu& of Political Behaviour in the United Nations (1964) 
11. 
29 Nnrrgaard, above n 21,236. 
30 See the United Nations Human Rights Committee, Continuity of Obligations, General Comment 26, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.8/Rev.l, 8/12/97, para. 4: 'The rights established in the Covenant belong to the people 
living in the territory of the State party.. . once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the 
Covenant, such protection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them'. 
31 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 
November 1950,213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
32 Protocol 1 1, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
33 Charter of the Organisation ofAmerican States (1948), 119 UNTS 4, created the OAS. 
34 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 November 1969, 1 144 UNTS 123, art 33,62 
(entered into force 18 July 1978); see also Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1979) GA 
OAS Res 447, art l ,20 <http://www.cidh.oas.org/basic.htm> at 2 September 2003. 
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(the African established by the Organisation of Afi-ican Unity (OAU), 
though the court is not yet functioning.36 
B Access 
There is no need to be an actual victim of a violation to bring a claim in the 
American37 and ~ f i i c a n ~ ~  systems, and claims may be brought by third parties, 
including Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOS).'~ The European system limits 
standing to those claiming to be victims, but NGOs often provide assistance in 
bringing claims.40 The European Court has extended its protection to legal persons 
such as companies, political parties and NGOS,"' but the American and African 
systems do not appear to have done so.42 
All three systems have an element of compulsory jurisdiction. All contracting 
parties of the European Convention must accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court, and since the abolition of the European Commission, victims have direct 
access.43 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the American 
Commission) may hear claims from victims in any OAS member state concerning 
violations of selected articles of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
(DRM);~ as well as claims concerning violations of the American Convention with 
regard to those state parties. Remarkably, the power to adjudicate individual claims 
in respect of OAS member states not party to the American Convention was not 
expressly granted by the OAS, and although initially contested by some states, 
appears now to have been accepted. Access to the Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights (the American Court) is limited to those claiming against state parties to the 
35 Afiican Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights, opened for signature 27 June 198 1, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
Rev. 5,21 ILM 58 (entered into force 21 October 1986). 
36 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and PeopleslRights, opened 
for signature 9 June 1998, Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCGPR/PRPT/III, 6 IHRR 3 (1 999) 89 1 (entered into force 25 
January 2004). As yet, there have been no judges elected or rules of procedure drawn up for the Court. 
37 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) art 1, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to 
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OENSer.L.ViII.82 doc.6 rev.1 (1992), 
<http://www.cidh.oas.org/basic.htm> at 2 September 2003; American Convention on Human Rights art l(2). 
38 The provisions only refer to physical persons. 
39 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2000) art 23, reprinted in Basic 
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System. <http://www.cidh.oas.org/basic.htm> at 2 
September 2003; African Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights art 55. Of the 47 communications published by 
the Afiican Commission in its last five Annual Activity Reports, only 9 have not been brought by NGOs. 
40 See Marek Nowicki, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Before the European Commission of Human 
Rights in Villiger Salvia (ed) The Birth of European Human Rights Law, Liber Amicorum Carl Aage Nargaard 
(1998) 267-8,296. 
" See Autronic AG v Switzerland (1 990) 178 Eur Crt HR 9 (ser A); Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland 
(1992) 246 Eur Crt HR (ser A); United Communist Party of Turkey and others v Turkey (1998) VI Eur Crt HR. 
42 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has expressly rejected this in Tabacalera Boquerbn SA v 
Paraguay (1997), Rep 47/97 Inter-Am Cmm H R paras 24-5,36-37. See Cantos v Argentina (Preliminary 
Objections) (2001) Inter-Am Ct H R (ser C) no. 85 para 29, for a limited exception. 
43 These changes were implemented by Protocol 1 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. 
44 Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights art 20; The Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
has stated that the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man is legally binding on OAS members: 
Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights (Advisory) (1989) no. 10 (ser A) paras 35-45. 
28 Individual Petition in Regional and Global Human Rights 
American Convention who have expressly accepted the Court's juri~diction.~~ 
Claimants must have their cases decided by the American Commission before being 
able to proceed to the Changes to the Commission's Rules of Procedure 
mean that cases where the state is found in violation will almost always proceed to 
the The Ahcan Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African 
Commission) is able to receive petitions regarding violations by state parties to the 
African Charter without their prior consent. It has been suggested that this is 
probably because it was not foreseen that the African Commission would interpret 
its powers so as to exercise this adjudicatory fi~nction.~~ It appears that individuals 
will have limited direct access to the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(the Afhcan Court), and that the normal course for claims will be to pass first 
through the African Commission, as in the American system.49 
Only the European system presently offers legal aid to  claimant^,^' although the 
African Court may provide free legal representation.51 Claimants in the Ahcan and 
American systems are forced to rely on NGOs to cover fees associated with their 
claim, or to provide counsel.52 Although the American Commission is known to 
help defray victims' legal and travel costs, its limited funds mean this does not 
occur as a matter of course.53 Each system offers some legal protection of 
petitioners, witnesses and counsel from intimidation by national authorities (though 
this protection exists only in the Protocol to the African Charter on the 
Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights in the African 
system).54 
45 American Convention on Human Rights art 62. Together with the rules of procedure which allow victims 
standing independently of the Commission, this effectively gives individuals autonomous access to the Court. 
46 American Convention on Human Rights arts 48, 50; There presently exists a Draft Optional Protocol to the 
American Convention permitting individuals direct access to the Court once the Commission has processed the 
claim: Draft Optional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (2001) OAE (ser P) 
AG/CP/doc.629/0 1. 
47 It has now become 'practically impossible' not to send a case to the Court, both because states very rarely comply 
with the three month time limit, and because the Commission finds it 'very difficult to explain why it will not send a 
case to the Court': Veronica Gomez (speech delivered at Nottingham University's Human Rights Centre, 20 June 
2002). 
48 Afkican Charter on Human andPeoples ' Rights arts 55-56; Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, 'The Individual Complaints 
Procedures of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Preliminary Assessment' (1998) 8 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 359. 
49 Protocol to the AJi-ican Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights art 5(3): 
the Court 'may entitle' individuals to institute cases before it; Harrington, 'The Afi-ican Court on Human and 
Peoples' kghts' in Evans and Murray (eds), The African Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights, The System in 
Practice, 1986-2000 (2002), 305,3 15,3 19. 
50 Rules of the European Court of Human Rights, Chapter X ,  'Legal Aid', 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng!General.htm at 3 September 2003. 
5 ' ~ r ~ t o c ~ l  to the AJi-ican charter on the ~stablishm~nt of the AJi-ican Court on Human and Peoples' Rights art 
1 O(2). 
52 Gomez, above n 47. 
53  hid. 
54 The European system: 27 members of the Council of Europe have ratified the European Agreement Relating to 
Persons Participating in Proceedings o f  the European Court of Human Rights, opened for signature 5 March 1996, 
ETS 16 1 ; The Ahcan system: see Protocol to the AJi-ican Charter on the Establishment of the AJi-ican Court on 
Human and PeopleslRights art lO(3); The Inter-American system: see Rules of Procedure of the inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (2000) art 6, Rules of Procedure of the inter-American Court of Human Rights art 50, 
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System. 
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Guidance on making applications may be found on the internet for each 
although the effectiveness of this depends on a claimant's ability to access the 
internet, their computer literacy, and the ability to read one of the website's 
languages. 
Claimants are entitled to present their cases in their own right. Formerly the 
European and American systems permitted claimants such autonomous access only 
before their Commissions. Cases that went on to the Court were taken by the 
Commission, which allowed the claimant to form part of its delegation, but did not 
necessarily conduct the case according to his or her wishes? This appears to be the 
procedure envisaged when the Ahcan Court comes into being.57 The European and 
American systems now allow the claimant to make autonomous representations 
before their Courts (although technically, only the American Commission and state 
parties may seize the American The American Commission still retains its 
role before the Court, despite the ability of the claimant to participate 
autonomously.59 Interestingly a state now faces representations from both the 
Commission and the ~laimant,~' though the wording of the Court's Rules brings 
into question whether the Commission's role alters where the applicant is unable to 
provide for autonomous representation? 
All three Courts may receive written or oral evidence, and will usually hold oral 
hearings where witnesses may be examined and cross-examined.62 Oral hearings 
are less common before the Afi-ican and American Commissions, with most cases 
heard by c~ r r e s~ondence .~~  The language of proceedings is limited to one of the 
<http://www.cidh.oas.org/basic.htm> at 2 September 2003. Note that it is doubtful whether members of the Inter- 
American system consider themselves bound as this does not feature in the American Convention on Human Rights. 
55  Information for applicants in the European system is available in all the languages of member states: 
<http://www.echr.coe.intl> at 3 September 2003. Information for applicants in the Inter-American system is 
available in English, Spanish, French and Portuguese: <http://www.cidh.oas.org/denuncia.eng.ht at 3 September 
2003. Information on applications to the African Commission may be found in English and French: 
<http://www.achpr.org/ACHPRRinf.-sheet-no d o c  at 3 September 2003. 
56 See statement of the European Court in Lawless v Ireland (1961) 2 Eur Crt HR (ser A) 24.: See also rule 33(3)(d) 
of the 1983 version of the European Court's Rules of Procedure; See also Harris, Warbrick and O'Boyle, Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1999) 661. On the American system see Buergenthal, International Law 
ofHuman Rights in a Nutshell (2nd ed, 1995) 154. 
57 The Ahcan Commission has automatic access: Protocol to the AJi-ican Charter on the Establishment of the 
Afiican Court on Human and Peoples' Rights art 5(3). 
58 American Convention on Human Rights art 61. Though note the Draft Optional Protocol, above n 46. 
59 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights art 22, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining 
to Human Rights in the Inter-American System <http://www.cidh.oas.org/basic.htm> at 2 September 2003. 
60 Ibid; it had been suggested that this role might diminish or disappear due to financial constraints as more cases are 
brought before the Court: Gomez, above n 49. However, the Commission continues to participate in proceedings, 
and the OAS has approved budget increases for both the Commission and Court for 2004: Resolution of the 
Permanent Council of the OAS, 29 January 2003, CPRES.835. 
Article 33(3) of the Court's Rules ofprocedure mandates the Commission to act 'on behalf o f  the applicant. 
62 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts 36,40; Rules of the 
European Court of Human Rights r 63,65,68; Rules ofprocedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights art 
42; For the African Court see Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the Afiican Court on Human 
and Peoples' Rights art 26. 
63 Rules ofprocedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights art 60. Of the 22 cases (merits) featured 
in its 2000 Annual Report, eight contained hearings: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual 
Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2000, OEAISer.ILNIII.111 doc. 20 rev.; Article 120 of 
the Rules ofProcedure of the AJi-ican Commission on Human and Peoples ' Rights appears to provide only for 
written proceedings, but commentators indicate otherwise: see Ahmed Motala, 'Non-Governmental Organisations in 
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official languages in all three systems, but interpreters are made available for those 
with difficulty.64 
C Remedies 
All three systems employ both interim and final orders. Interim orders may be made 
where there exists danger of irreparable harm, and are usually utilised where there is 
danger of loss of life. Remarkably, although there is no express provision in the 
European Convention granting the ~ o u r t , 6 ~  or the American Convention granting 
the Commission, such powers, both bodies have determined that interim measures 
are binding on states? The final judgments of the European, American and African 
Courts are binding in the sense that states have undertaken to comply with them.67 
Both the European and American Courts routinely award legal costs incurred in 
bringing a claim to a vindicated claimant,68 but there is no mention of this power in 
the Protocol establishing the African Court. All three courts are empowered to 
award reparations (including for intangible loss such as distress and anxiety), 
though the European and American courts may consider that a mere declaration of a 
violation is a sufficient remedy.69 Aside from directing compensation, the European 
Court will not give states specific directions as to administrative7' or legislative71 
the Ahcan System' in Evans and Murray (eds), The Afiican Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights: The System in 
Practice (2002) 246,258. See also Rachel Murray, The Afiican Commission on Human and Peoples 'Rights and 
International Law (2000) 20: '[a] number of parties do attend the sessions to present their case, although this is not 
obligatory and the hearing will take place even if only one party is present'. 
64 Rules of the European Court of Human Rights r 34; Rules ofprocedure of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights art 20; Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights art 22; Rules of Procedure of 
the Afiican Commission on Human and Peoples 'Rights, 13 February 1998, AFR/COM/HPR.I (11), r 34,35 
<http://sim.law.uu.nVSIM/Library/books.ns at 3 September 2003. 
65 There is no express power in the European Convention regarding the grant of interim measures. This power exists 
only in the Rules of the European Court ofHuman Rights: r 39(1). 
66 In Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v Turkey (2003) Eur Crt HR 88-1 11, the European Court connected the 
binding quality of its interim measures to Article 36 of the European Convention, the right to an effective remedy; 
The American Commission has stated that to ignore its requests for interim measures in such as way as to deprive 
victims of their right to petition the Commission and cause 'serious and irreparable harm to those individuals.. . is 
inconsistent with the state's human rights obligations': cited in Veronica Gomez, 'The Inter-American System: 
Recent Cases' (2001) 1 Human Rights Law Review 319,330. The power of the Ahcan Commission with respect to 
interim measures stems from rule 1 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the Afiican Commission on Human and Peoples ' 
Rights. It is probably sensible to conclude, in the absence of an express opinion of the African Commission, and 
having regard to the fact that the power is not contained in the Afiican Charter itself, that it does not consider them 
binding. 
67 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art 46(1); American 
Convention on Human Rights art 68(1). Protocol to the Afiican Charter on the Establishment of the Afiican Court 
on Human and Peoples' Rights art 30. 
68 This includes costs incurred at the domestic level. See, eg, European Court: Zimmermann and Steiner v 
Switzerland (Merits and Just Satisfaction) (1983) 66 Eur Crt HR (ser A) 36; Loayza Tamayo v Peru (Reparations) 
(1 998) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C) no 42 para 178. 
69 The European system: see, eg, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium (Merits) (1 98 1) 43 Eur Crt HR 
(ser A) para 16; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK (Merits and Just Satisfaction) (1985) 94 Eur Crt HR (ser 
A) paras 95'96. The American Court appears to order compensation more readily than the European Court: see, eg, 
Ivcher Bronstein v Peru (Judgment) (2001) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C) no. 84 para 183; Velazquez Rodriguez Cme 
(Compensatory Damages) (1989) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) no. 7 para 36. 
70 Such as the annulment of disciplinary actions: Albert and Le Compte v Belgium (Merits) (1983) 58 Eur Crt HR 
(ser A) para 9; or a direction to institute criminal proceedings: Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 25 Eur Crt HR (ser 
A) para 187. 
71 'The Court notes that the Convention does not empower it to order Switzerland to alter its legislation; the Court's 
judgment leaves to the State the choice of the means to be used in its domestic legal system to give effect to its 
obligation': Belilos v Switzerland (1988) 132 Eur Crt HR (ser A) para 78. 
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action, leaving it to the state party itself to decide how best to give effect to the 
finding of a violation. However, this is partly compensated for by the supervision of 
the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers (see below).72 The American Court 
will direct states to take particular administrative and legislative action, such as to 
conduct an investigation or amend legislation.73 
States have not undertaken to abide by the recommendations issued by either the 
African or American Commissions. However, the American Court considers states 
to be bound by the Commission's decisions, at least with regard to those cases 
decided under the American  onv vent ion.^^ The American Commission will often 
recommend the payment of adequate reparation but does not specify an amount. 
Like the Court it will make directions to the state as to administrative and legislative 
measures it should take, such as conducting an investigation, holding a retrial, 
releasing an individual from detention or making specific changes to its laws.75 The 
African Commission rarely directs payment of compensation and will not specify 
an amount.76 More often it will recommend a particular course of action such as the 
release of detainees or the repeal of legislation.77 
D Compliance 
Compliance with decisions is monitored by bodies composed of state 
representatives. The European Court's decisions are supervised by the Council of 
Europe's Committee of ~ in i s t e r s~ '  and also more recently its Parliamentary 
Assembly. As it delivers its decisions the Court transmits them to the Committee of 
Ministers, where they remain on the agenda until the state has shown that it has 
taken both the specific measures ordered by the Court and general measures to 
prevent the violation recurring in future.79 The Committee of Ministers may receive 
information regarding the execution of the judgment from the vindicated claimant, 
72 The Committee of Ministers recently 'encouraged' State parties 'to examine their national legal systems with a 
view to ensuring that there exist adequate possibilities of re-examination of the case, including reopening of 
proceedings, in instances where the Court has found a violation of the Convention': Committee of Ministers of the 
European Court of Human Rights, Re-examination or Reopening of Certain Cases at Domestic Level Following 
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (2000) Recommendation no. R, adopted 19 January 2000, 
reprinted in 21 Human Rights Law Journal (2000) No. 4-7,272. 
73 See, eg, Velasquez Rodriguez Case (Compensatory Damages) (1989) Inter-Am Ct H R (ser C) no. 7 para 34; 
Caballero-Delgado and Santana v Colombia (Merits) (1 995) Inter-Am Ct H R (ser C) no. 22 para 18 1. 
74 See Loayza Tamayo v Peru (Merits) (1997) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) no 33 paras 78-82: 'by ratifying [the 
American Convention], States Parties engage themselves to apply the recommendations made by the Commission in 
its reports'. 
75 See, eg, Dayra Maria Levoyer Jimknez v Ecuador (2001) Rep 66/01 Inter-Am. Cmm. H.R. para 123; Joseph 
Thomas v Jamaica (200 1) Rep 12710 1 Inter-Am. Cmrn. H.R. sVII; Milton Garcia Fajardo et a1 v Nicaragua 
(2000) Rep 100101 Inter-Am. Cmm. H.R. para 1 13 in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual 
Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2001,OEAISer./LNlII.114, doc. 5 rev. 
76 For a rare instance see Malawi AJi.ican Association v Mauritania (2001) No 54/91, 8 IHRR 1,268. 
77 See, eg, Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Wahab Akamu, G Adega and others) v Nigeria (1 996) No 
60/91,3 IHRR 132; Annette Pagnoulle (on behalfofAbdoulaye Mazou) v Cameroon (1999) No. 39/90,6 IHRR 
8 19; Civil Liberties Organisation, Legal Defence Centre, Legal Defence Assistance Project v Nigeria (2002) No. 
218/98,9 IHRR 266. 
78 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art 46(2). 
79 See, eg, Modinos v Cyprus (Merits and Just Satisfaction) (1993) 259 Eur Crt HI2 (ser A): the government paid 
compensation to the claimant in 1993, but the Committee remained seized of the matter until 2001, when Turkey 
informed it of changes to its legislation decrirninalising consensual homosexual sexual intercourse in private. 
<http:Ncm.coe.intlstat/E/Public/2001/adopted~texts/resDH/200 1 resdh-l52.htm> at 3 May 2002. 
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and will address resolutions to states on specific cases with respect to their status of 
compliance. The strong terms of these resolutions are unmatched by other regional 
or UN-based systems.80 The Parliamentary Assembly has also begun to follow-up 
the implementation of judgments of the European Court, requesting information 
from violating states through questions in special committees and in Parliamentary 
sessions.81 
In contrast, decisions in the American and African systems are transmitted via 
annual reports to the deliberative bodies of the O A S ~ ~  and the African Union 
( A U ) , ~ ~  as well as to the parties to the case when the decision is handed down. The 
Assemblies of these organisations then tend to adopt a resolution endorsing the 
reports in general terms. The OAS Assembly will urge states generally to comply 
with decisions on individual petitions.84 During the late 1970s the OAS Assembly 
addressed situations brought to its attention by the American Commission's annual 
reports,85 but it has been suggested that this was due to pressure from the Carter 
Government in the United States to support the Commission's work? Outside this 
timeframe, it has tended to be the Commission rather than recalcitrant states that 
have attracted disapproval from the ~ s s e m b l ~ . ~ ~  The OAS Assembly resolutions 
from recent years make no mention of individual judgments or decisions. These 
resolutions merely extend to urging 'the member States to continue their 
collaboration with the Commission and the support for those and to 
'reiterate that the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are final 
and may not be appealed and that the States Parties to the Convention undertake to 
comply with the rulings of the Court in all cases to which they are party'.89 Only in 
rare cases (and at the insistence of the Court) has the OAS Assembly urged states to 
80 See, eg, Committee of Ministers, Non-Execution of the judgment in the case of Loizidou v Turkey (2000) Interim 
Resolution DH, in (2000) 2 1 Human Rights Law Journal 272. 
See, eg, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Execution of Judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Res 1226 (2000) para. 1 1, in (2000) 2 1 Human Rights Law Journal 273. 
82 Charter of the Organisation of American States art 91(f); Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights art 18(f); Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1979) GA OAS Res 448, art 30 
<http://www.cidh.oas.orgibasic.htm>; Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights art 25(6). 
83 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has been replaced by the African Union: see the Constitutive Act of the 
Afiican Union, opened for signature 1 1 July 2000, entered into force 26 May 2001 
<http://www.au2002.gov,za/docs/key~oau/index.html> at 3 September 2003; Afiican Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights art 54; Rules of Procedure of the Afiican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights r 79. 
84 See, eg, Organisation of American States, AG/RES. 1783,5 June 2001 para. 5; See similarly, Organisation of 
American States, AG/RES. 1715,5 June 2000 para. 4; AGRES. 1660 (XXIX-0199) 7/6/99 para. 3; A G E S .  
1606 (XXVIII-0198) 3/6/98 para. 2. 
ss For an assessment of the General Assembly's attitude, see Vernonica Gornez, 'The Interaction between the 
Political Actors of the OAS, the Commission and the Court' in Harris and Livingstone (eds), The Inter-American 
System of Human Rights (1998) 173, 192-201. 
86 David Harris, 'Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American Achievement' in David Harris and 
Stephen Livingstone (eds), The Inter-American System of Human Rights (1 998) 1 ,2  1. 
87 Veronica Gomez, 'The Interaction between the Political Actors of the OAS, the Commission and the Court,' 
aboven85, 191. 
88 See Organisation of American States, AG/RES. 1783,5 June 2001 para 5; Organisation of American States 
AG/RES. 17 15,5 June 2000 para 4; Organisation of American States, AG/RES. 1660,7 June 1999 para 3; 
Organisation of American States, AGIRES. 1606,3 June 1998 para 2. 
89 Organisation of American States, A G E S .  1827,5 June 2001 para 4; see also Organisation of American States, 
A G E S .  17 16,5 June 2000 para 4. 
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comply with judgments.90 It appears to have made comments regarding compliance 
with Court judgments only in the past two years. With regard to the Ahcan system, 
it appears that the OAU Assembly does not even mention individual petitions.91 It is 
doubtful whether supervision of compliance will be more robust with the AU 
(which has replaced the OAU), even though the AU Treaty states that one of the 
objectives of the organisation is to 'promote and protect human and peoples' rights 
in accordance with the African Charter and other relevant human rights 
instr~ments'.~' Nsongurua Udombana suggests that any improvements are merely a 
cosmetic exercise by the OAU7s Member States to impress Western donor 
countries and international financial institutions.. . in order to attract more 
development assistance and receive some debt palliatives.93 
The American Court and Commission, and the African Commission, do exercise 
follow-up functions by soliciting reports from the parties on compliance and issuing 
decisions thereon.94 While the African Commission exercises this function in an ad 
hoc manner, the American Commission and Court include information on all cases 
in their annual reports.95 
Comprehensive studies on the rate of compliance for the three systems do not 
appear to exist, but it is possible to form a general impression. Decisions of the 
European Court seem to have secured changes to legislation and compensation in 
the majority of cases,96 with the problem of repetitive violations limited to a few 
 state^.^' It appears that only in very few cases have serious refusal or delay to 
comply occurred for political reasons.98 The American system appears to secure 
compliance in a small minority of cases,99 while the African Commission has been 
even less successf~1.'~~ 
90 The OAS Assembly appears to have passed one such resolution: see Baena Ricardo y Otros v Panama 
(Competence) (2003) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) no 104 para. 1 1 I.  
91 In its Resolutions on the Ahcan Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, it makes no mention of decisions 
from individual petitions or even a general statement about the need for compliance. 
92 Constitutive Act of the Apican Union art 3(e). 
93 See Nsongurua Udombana, 'Can the Leopard Change its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights' 
(2002) 17 American University International Law Review 1 177, 1 198, 1200. 
94 Rules ofProcedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights art 46(1); Statute of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights art 30. 
95 The Afncan Commission is known to have sent letters to States requesting information on compliance, and has 
recommended sending delegates in person to gain information from states. It has occasionally stated its intention to 
verify compliance with recommendations during an in loco visit, but from reading the cases this does not appear to 
be usual practice, and it would probably have difficulty conducting regular in loco visits to all states to whom it had 
made recommendations: see Rachel Murray, The African Commission on Human and Peoples ' Rights and 
International Law (2000) 2 1. 
96 For a discussion of the studies on efficacy, see Mark Janis, Richard Kay and Anthony Bradley, European Human 
Rights Law (2"d ed, 2000) 84-86. For a list of changes in legislation see European Court of Human Rights, Eflects of 
Judgments or Cases 1959-1 998 <http://www.echr.coe.int~En~~EDocsEffectsOffudgments.html at 3 May 2002. 
This source also states: '[tlo date States which have been ordered to make payments under Article 50 have 
consistently done so'. 
97 Rapporteur Erik Jurgens, Report on the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (2000) 
2 1 Human Rights Law Journal 275. 
98 Ibid paras 39-42. 
99 Of the 18 cases which the Commission visited in its 2001 annual report, it considered that no states had complied 
in full with its recommendations, two had complied in part, 13 had replied with information requested by the 
Commission, but had not complied with any recommendations, and three had neither furnished any information, nor 
complied: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on 
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E Comment 
Of the three, the victim appears to be best placed under the European system, where 
there is direct access to the Court, legal aid, and a high likelihood of compliance 
with judgments. In terms of individual access, the Ahcan and American models do 
appear to be following the institutional progression of the European model, with 
both the African and American systems having created a Court. Each system 
initially placed the individual in a relatively weak position by limiting access to its 
Court. Formerly under the European Convention, only a member state or the 
Commission could bring cases to the European Court. The European Court stated 
that the Commission delegation could be aided by someone of its choice, which in 
practice became the victim's counsel.10' This also became the practice of the 
American Commission before the American Court (see above). Later (in 1983) the 
European Court changed its Rules of Procedure and permitted the victim separate 
representation once the case had been referred to the Court, effectively making the 
applicant a party to the proceedings.1o2 The entry into force of the Ninth Protocol to 
the European Convention also granted the applicant the ability to refer the case to 
the Court after the Commission's decision.lo3 The same steps have been taken 
within the American system. The individual is now in effect granted standing by 
changes to the American Court's Rules of Procedure, while changes to the 
American Commission's Rules effectively grant individuals the ability to refer 
cases themselves. However, the inevitability of the American Commission referring 
almost all cases of violations to the American Court means that without an increase 
in resources, the system will be in danger of collapsing under the weight of its own 
success, just as the European system formerly (see below). 
As discussed above, both the American and African systems have effectively 
developed compulsory jurisdiction in relation to their commissions. With respect to 
the American Commission this extends to all member states of the OAS, which are 
bound by the DRM. While this is a remarkable achievement it cannot be a 
satisfactory substitute for the compulsory jurisdiction of a regional court. Such 
compulsory jurisdiction was established in the European system with the entry into 
Human Rights 2001,OEA/Ser./LNIII. 1 14, doc. 5 rev. The 2000 Annual Report of the American Court reveals a 
similar pattern. Out of the ten judgments where the Court reviewed compliance, in only one did there appear to be 
partial compliance: Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights 2000, Section I1 'Status of Compliance with the Judgments of the Court' 
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/publicaciones~ing/contents2000.html> at 27 May 2002. 
100 The African Commission has stated that save for one, 'the attitude of State Parties.. . has been to generally ignore 
its recommendations': in Rachel Murray, above n 95,2 1. At the 22nd session of the Commission, the Chairman of 
the Commission is reported to have said that 'none of the decisions on individual communications taken by the 
Commission and adopted by the Assembly has ever been implemented': see Rachel Murray, Report on the 1997 
Sessions of the AJFican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights - 21" and 22& Sessions: 15-25 April and 2-1 l 
November 1997 (1998) 19 Human Rights Law Journal 169-70. 
lo' Lawless v Ireland ( 1  96 1 )  2 Eur Crt HR (ser A) 24. 
102 See David Harris, Colin Warbrick and Michael O'Boyle, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(1 999) 66 1. 
103 Ninth Protocol to the European Conventionfor the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
ETS 140 (entered into force 1 October 94). 
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force of Protocol 11 to the European convention.lo4 It is to be hoped that the 
American and Ahcan models will continue to follow this trend and make 
individual petition before their judicial bodies compulsory. 
In terms of compliance, neither the American nor African systems seem to apply 
much pressure on individual states to comply with decisions and judgments. In this 
respect one can compare the resolutions of the Afirican and American Assemblies 
with documents produced by the European Council's Committee of Ministers and 
the Parliamentary Assembly. As seen above, those of the Committee of Ministers 
address specific states over specific violations and persist in engaging the state until 
satisfactory remedial action is taken. By contrast, the American and African 
Assemblies deliver only general exhortations to comply with the decisions of 
human rights bodies. 
It is important to note that the American and African Commissions have also 
dedicated much work to drafting country reports addressing the causes of 
widespread human rights violations.105 While in doing so they may receive 
information from individuals, these procedures are not intended to grant 
individualised remedies. lo6 However, this function does allow a clearer assessment 
of problems affecting whole states or regions, and thus has the potential to benefit a 
wider group of individuals. Country reports are arguably a better response than 
judgments on individual cases when violations are widespread and rooted in 
problems with governance and the organisation of power as a whole.lo7 Although 
some thematic reporting existed previously, the European system had no means of 
addressing gross or systematic violations of human rights until the establishment of 
the Commissioner for Human fights in 1999.1°8 This may reflect the fact that until 
this time such serious and large-scale violations were thought to be uncommon 
among member states. However, with the advent of new member states from 
Eastern Europe such a facility has become neces~ary. '~~ The work of the Council of 
Europe is also complemented by European Union membership requirements for 
candidate states. Candidates are required to satisfy certain human rights 
104 Eleventh Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
ETS 155 (entered into force 1 November 1998). 
105 Apican Charter on Human and Peoples 'Rights art 58(1), 46; see Harris, above n 88,2-3; see also Farer, 'The 
Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox' in Harris and Livingstone 
(eds), The Inter-American System of Human Rights ( 1  998) 3 1,62. 
106 See, eg, Mission to Mauritania, The Ahcan Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, loth Annual Activity 
Report 1996/1997, Annex IX sIII <http://www.up.ac.za/chr/ahrdb/acomm_10th.html#b2> at 7 September 2003. 
107 The country report will provide the detail to gauge the situation in the whole country, but will not usually deal 
with individual violations. An individual petition will only identify the harms done to a section of society at most, 
but will allow the chance to produce an individualised remedy. Mingling them will allow both. 
108 Established by the Committee of Ministers, European Court of Human Rights, Res (99) 50; The Commissioner 
has so far produced 28 'visit' reports: 
<http://www.coe.int/T/E/Commissioner~H.R/Communication~Unit/Documents/By_se~# 
TopOfPage> at 4 April 2004. 
109 Of the 21 visit reports produced, 14 concern States in Eastern Europe that have joined the Council of Europe 
relatively recently: 
<http://www.coe.int/T/E/Commissioner~H.R/Communication~Unit/Documents/By_se~slindex.asp# 
TopOfPage> at 4 April 2004. 
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standards,ll0 as well as adopt the aquis cornmunautaire, which includes the 
European  onv vent ion."' While it appears that the standards set and the 
accompanying monitoring are not particularly rigorous,l12 it does guarantee the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court in respect of these states without 
particular deference to their free consent. 
United Nations organs are able to receive and act on individual petitions under two 
separate mechanisms, those established under the UN Charter and those created by 
separate UN-sponsored human rights treaties. 
A Institutional Structure 
The UN Charter mechanisms operate through the Commission on Human Rights 
(the CHR)") and its Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights (the sub-~ornmission)."~ The CHR is composed of 53 state representatives 
and meets for six weeks annually to discuss human rights issues. 
The CHR may engage states under a confidential or a public procedure. 
Communications generally begin in the confidential ' 1 503 procedure'. ' l5  When the 
Sub-commission receives communications which reveal a 'consistent pattern of 
gross and reliably attested violations of human rights' it may draw up a confidential 
report which it then passes on to the CHR to discuss in private sessions.116 The 
CHR generally uses this as an opportunity to commence dialogue with the state in 
question, and may appoint a special rapporteur, or transfer consideration to the 
public '1235 Under the 1235 procedure the CHR and the Sub- 
Commission may conduct 'a thorough study', which they will usually do through 
the establishment of a special rapporteur.' l 8  
110 Treaty on European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992, OJ C325, art 49 (entered into force 1 
November 1993): only a state 'which respects the principles set out in Article 6 (1) may apply to become a member 
of the Union'. Article 6(1) states that the Union is founded on, amongst other things, 'respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms'. 
111 Council of Europe, The Council of Europe's Contribution to the Enlargement of the European Union, Acquis of 
the European Union Under Title IVof the TEC and Title VI of the TEU (2001), SdC (2002) 3,33. 
112 Marek Nowak called the 1997 report 'rather superficial and related more to the de jure rather than to the de facto 
situation': see Marek Nowak, 'Human Rights Conditionality in the EU' in Alston (ed), The EUand Human Rights 
(2000). 
113 Articles 60 and 68 of the Charter of the United Nations established the Economic and Social Council, which then 
created the CHR to 'promote human rights'. 
114 Established by the CHR under ECOSOC Res 9 (11), 21 June 1946. Its name was changed from the Sub- 
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1999. 
' I5  The 1503 Procedure enables two bodies of the UN - the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection on 
Human Rights and the CHR - to examine complaints which appear to show consistent patterns of gross and 
reliably attested human rights violations: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, The 1503 Procedure, 
E/RES/1503 (XLVIII), amended by E/RES/2000/3. 
l6 Ibid, para 2. 
117 See United Nations Blue Book Series, The UnitedNations and Human Rights 1945-1995 (1995) 246. 
118 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, E/RES/1235 (XLII), 6 June 1967, reprinted in United Nations 
Blue Book Series, above n 1 16, para. 3. 
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B Access 
Communications to the CHR or its Sub-commission under the 1503 procedure are 
written, and participation of the individual is usually limited to the transmission of 
the initial communication. l9  The only publicity surrounding the 1503 procedure is 
the naming of those states under considerati~n.'~~ 
The CHR and the Sub-commission have created working groups and special 
rapporteurs to conduct thematic and country specific studies under the 1235 
procedure. In drawing up their reports they may receive information fiom 
individuals. In general, country rapporteurs will not react to such communications 
as individual cases. Instead they tend to regard them simply as information which 
assists in building a picture of the situation in that state.l2l However, thematic 
rapporteurs will engage governments on specific communications received.lz2 
Proceedings are written, which does not allow the individual to present a case in 
person, but the petitioner is kept informed of government replies, and will often be 
given the opportunity to answer the state's response to the comm~nication.'~' 
To facilitate access for the individual, the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human fights has produced web pages in English, French and Spanish, detailing 
how the procedures work and providing 'model questionnaires' to be used to submit 
a communication to any of the bodies or procedures discussed. Although a welcome 
move, as mentioned above there are problems of accessibility.124 
C Remedies 
The Charter-based procedures are not geared towards providing individualised 
remedies, with both the 1503 and 1235 procedures being triggered only by large- 
scale violations. Of course, once a rapporteur or working group is established they 
may act on individual cases, but most of the rapporteurs exercise a 'diplomatic' 
rather than quasi-judicial function with regard to cornrn~nications.~~~ They pass on 
the communications to the governments in question and solicit a reply. They do not 
119 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet, No 71Rev. 1 
<http:llwww.unhchr.ch/htmVmenu6/2/fs7.htm#1503> at 4 September 2003. 
It seems 83 states have so far been considered: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, States 
examined under the 1503 Procedure by the Commission on Human Rights (as up to 2003), 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/htmhenU2/8/statl ,htm> at 4 September 2003. 
121 See Report of the Special Rapporteur: Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2001, 
Un Doc E/CN.4/2001/40 para 1 1. 
122 See 'Summary of communications transmitted to Governments and replies received' in Addendum to the Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on Torture 2000, UN Doc E/CN/2002/76/Add.l; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression 2002, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2002/75/Add.2. 
'23 Ibid. 
124 See website of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/rnenu2/8/question.htm at 14 June 2002; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Sudan 2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/46 para. 23. 
125 For example, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders is mandated to establish 'cooperation and 
conduct dialogue.. . on the promotion and effective implementation of the Declaration [on Human Rights 
Defenders]': United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Res 2000161 para 3(b). 
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exercise an adjudicatory function in formulating findings or recommendations for 
the state to f01low.l~~ Obviously, a request for a reply cannot be equated with a 
request to comply with standards or provide a remedy.'27 
However, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), and to a lesser 
extent the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID), 
exercise a quasi-judicial role comparable to that of one of the regional Commissions 
or UN treaty bodies. One reason for this difference might be the wording of their 
mandates, which empower them to 'investigate' cases falling within their 
purview.128 However, the WGAD does not speak of 'victims', but rather 
'sources',129 and issues 'opinions' instead of 'decisions'. 13' It does not use the word 
'violation' as often as one might expect, preferring to state that there has been 
'non-observance' or 'contravention', or simply to say that the detention was 
arbitrary.131 The CHR and United Nations General Assembly (GA) tend to 
emphasise the non-binding nature of any views and requests for action issued by 
these bodies by drawing attention to their 'humanitarian' ~ a 1 u e . l ~ ~  Despite the use 
of cautious language (an obvious attempt to assuage state fears), the opinions 
appear in substance as legally reasoned decisions, containing a brief recital of the 
facts and legal reasoning. The WGAD makes both general recommendations for 
governments to take necessary steps to remedy the situation, and more specific 
recommendations such as the punishment of those responsible,'33 or the release of 
those detained. 134 
Both the country and thematic rapporteurs and working groups have an 'urgent 
action' procedure,135 which serves a similar function but is of a different nature to 
126 See 'Summary of communications transmitted to Governments and replies received' in Addendum to the Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on Torture 2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/76/Add. 1 ; Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion andprotection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion andE- pressi ion 2002, UN DOC 
E/CN.4/2002/75/Add.2; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers 2002, UN 
Doc E/CN.4/2002/72. 
127 For example, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances considers its work complete once it 
has received 'clarification' fiom the government as to the whereabouts or fate of the victim: Report of the Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/79 para. 3. 
128 See United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Question of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Res 
2001146, UN Doc E/CN/RES/2001/46 para 9; United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Question ofArbitrary 
Detention, Res 2000/36, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2000/36 para 12; The mandates of other rapporteurs however are less 
specific and contain promotional functions: see, eg, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights 
Defenders, Res 2000/61, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2000/61 para 3. 
'29 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet 26 The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
s4B <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs26.htm at 14 June 2002. 
130 hid; see also Commission on Human Rights, Question of Arbitrary Detention, Res 1997150, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/1997/50 para 7 .  
131 See Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 2000, Addendum One, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/200 111 4/Add. 1. 
132 See United Nations Commission on Human fights, Question of Arbitran, Detention, Res 2000/36, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2000/36 para 6. 
'33 See Opinion No. 2411 999 para 13 and Opinion No. 27/1999 para 13, in Report of the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention 1999, Addendum One, UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/4 /Add. 1. 
'34 Opinion No. 3011999 para 19, in Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 1999, Addendum One, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/4 /Add. 1. 
135 See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Urgent action' procedure under extra-co~zventional 
mechanisms <http://www.unhchr.ch/htmVmenu2/7/ua.htm at 4 June 2002; See also, Office of the High 
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the interim measures of the regional Commissions and global ~ornmit tees . '~~ 
Where a serious violation of human rights is thought to be imminent, a request for 
urgent action may be addressed to one of the rapporteurs, groups or representatives 
in that area. They in turn may then appeal to the government concerned to guarantee 
the rights of the alleged victim. The CHR has also emphasised the 'humanitarian' 
character of action taken under this procedure.137 
D Compliance 
The degree of compliance is extremely difficult to gauge; most bodies do not issue 
findings with which states comply. A fairly high proportion of states reply to 
special rapporteurs when requested.'38 The WGAD does not indicate the proportion 
of compliance with its views, but its requests for reply seem to meet with a good 
degree of success.'39 
Informed by the reports of its special rapporteurs (SRs) and working groups (WGs), 
the CHR - and subsequently the GA - may engage states through discussions 
(confidential where this is done under the 1503 procedure) and resolutions. Not all 
states 'graduate' from reports to CHR resolutions or GA  resolution^.'^^ Those 
resolutions addressing particular states, while based in the main on information 
fkom the SRs and WGs, only occasionally refer to compliance with cases being 
dealt with by them, and then in general terrns.14' Those resolutions concerning 
thematic issues will not name particular governments but rather make a general 
exhortation to 'the Governments concerned' to cooperate.'42 Incentive to comply 
may be hampered by the fact that there is no institutional distinction between the 
SRs and WGs and the CHR. The SRs and WGs do not so much act as supervisory 
bodies producing decisions, but rather inform the CHR, which then as a supervisory 
body itself decides if and how to engage states. 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Methods of 
Work, <http://www.unhchr.chhtdmenu2/7/b/execuexemeth.htm at 1 1 June 2002; 
136 Sir Nigel Rodley, former Special Rapporteur on Torture, points out that interim measures exist to preserve the 
possibility of a decision on the merits of a case. Urgent appeals however are preventive, existing simply to prevent 
loss of life, irrespective of the legality of a situation: Sir Nigel Rodley, (Speech delivered at the Annual Conference 
of the Association of Human Rights Institutes, Essex University, 20 September 2003). 
137 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Question ofArbitrary Detention, Res 1994132, UN Doc 
ElCN.4/RES/1994/32 para 8. 
'38 Eg Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture 2001, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/76 para 10: 37 out of 73 States 
replied when requested in 2001 ; Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions 2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/74 paras 12- 19: 45 out of 61 States replied when requested in 2002. 
139 Only 3 of 22 states did not reply when requested in 2002: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/77 paras 7-23. 
140 Philip Alston, 'The Commission on Human Rights' in Philip Alston (ed), The United Nations and Human Rights 
(1992) 126, 181; It has been noted that '[mlany Assembly resolutions have simply repeated or paraphrased language 
adopted by the Commission. An informal tradition appears to have developed that major innovations or reopening 
of work done by subsidiary organs should generally be avoided by the Assembly': Quinn, 'The General Assembly 
into the 1990s' in Philip Alston (ed), The UnitedNations and Human Rights (1992) 55,63. 
141 See, eg, Question of Human Rights in Afghanistan, GA Res 5511 19, UNGAOR, 55" Session, UN Doc 
A/Res/55/119 (2000) para 16 ; Human Rights Situation in Iraq, GA Res 5.511 15, UN GAOR, 55th Session, UN Doc 
AIResJ55/115 (2000) para 4(i). 
142 See Question of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, GA Res 551103, UN GAOR, 55' Session, UN Doc 
A/Res/55/103 (2000) para 14; See also Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
GA Res 55/89, UNGAOR, 55" Session, UN Doc A/Res/55/89 (2000) para 19. 
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There does not appear to be a comprehensive study of the impact of these 
procedures at the national level, with most examples being anecd0ta1.l~~ GA 
resolutions remark on cases of improvement but it is not possible to tell if this is due 
to the efforts of the Charter-based procedures.'44 Clearly, any improvement is 
dependent on the willingness of the state to cooperate.'45 For example, changes in 
Argentina in the 1980s have been attributed more to internal pressures and the 
Falklands War than the action of the C H R . ' ~ ~  On the other hand, it has been stated 
that it was only after the UN SRs visited Chile that some of the more dramatic 
improvements occurred. 147 
E Comment 
The Charter-based mechanisms minimise individual participation. Because the 
procedures are aimed at examining an overall situation, rather than a particular case, 
the individual's communication is a form of evidence. A communication that does 
not reveal widespread human rights violations is insufficient to trigger the 1503 or 
1235 procedures. The individual is a 'source' of information, not a party to a 
dispute. Perhaps with the exception of the WGAD, even the more individualised 
approaches of the SRs do not really perceive the individual as a party to a dispute. 
The WGEID describes its role as a mere 
channel of communication between families of the disappeared persons and the 
Governments concerned, with a view to ensuring that sufficiently documented and 
clearly identified individual cases are investigated and the whereabouts of the 
disappeared persons clarified. 14' 
In this sense the procedures bear similarities to the Mandate and Minority 
Protection Systems of the League of Nations, though these were much more limited 
in their scope and less intrusive. 
The most remarkable achievement is that of the WGAD, which acts almost like the 
Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
143 David Weissbrodt and Maria Bartolomei, 'The Effectiveness of International Human Rights Pressures: The Case 
of Argentina, 1976-1983' (1991) 75 Minnesota Law Review 1009,1009-1010. 
144 See for example Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, G A  Res 5511 16, UN GAOR, 55" Session, UN Doc 
AfResl551116 (2000) para 1; Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, G A  Res 5511 17, 
UN GAOR, 55" Session, UN Doc A/Res/551117 (2000) para 1; Situation of Human Rights in Mjlanmar, G A  Res 
56/23 1, UN GAOR, 56th Session, UN Doc ARes156123 1 (2001) paras 1-3. 
145 Iran and Iraq have in the past been intransigent in the face of public action under the 1235 procedure: Frank 
Newman and David Weissbrodt, International Human Rights: Law, Policy and Process, (2nd ed, 1996) 209. See 
Human Rights Situation in Iraq, G A  Res 5511 15, UN GAOR, 55" Session, UN Doc A/Resl55/115 (2000) preamble, 
para 5. 
'46 Ronald Dworkin, 'Nunca Mas: the Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared' (1 986) in 
Americas Watch Report, Truth and Partial Justice in Argentina (1987) 8. 
147 Henry Shelton, 'Utilization of Fact-Finding Missions To Promote and Protect Human Rights: The Chile Case' 
(1981) 2 Human Rights Law Journal l,35. See also Protection ofHuman Rights in Chile, G A  Res 361157, UN 
GAOR, 36" Session, UN Doc AfResl361157 (1 98 1). 
148 Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 2002, UN Doc ElCN.412002179,10; 
See also Question of Eforced or Involuntary Disappearances, G A  Res 551103, UN GAOR, 55th Session, UN Doc 
A/ResI551103 (2000) para 10. 
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Rights. It hears claims against states in a quasi-judicial manner without those states 
having expressly consented to such intrusive procedures. When looked at from this 
perspective, the Charter bodies are remarkable. They apply the standards of the 
Universal Declaration of Human ~ i ~ h t s ' ~ ~  and other international documents, 
which were not originally intended to be legally binding, to all states regardless of 
their express consent.15' They may also apply standards contained in treaties to 
which states are parties, even if that state has not consented to the individual 
petition procedure by the relevant treaty body.15' 
The work of the Charter bodies has been called the 
most dynamic and innovative part of the UN work in the field of human rights. 
Their current expansion and institutionalization reflect changes in the position of 
the individual in the international system and the role of the United Nations. They 
are far more intrusive than any treaty on which states are likely to agree.ls2 
The WGAD does this with greater force than the other bodies. This could be 
attributed in part to their weaker mandates, as well as their lack of resources and the 
large number of claims with which they are faced: 
The special rapporteurs have become overwhelmed with their increasing workload 
and limited resources. Another problem is that since their reports are so broad, and 
list violations occurring around the world, situations in particular countries often do 
not receive the attention they deserve.' 53 
While individual participation in the Charter-based procedures could be increased, 
individual petition should not exist for its own sake. Where gross and systematic 
violations are common it may be better to prioritise broader thematic and country- 
based procedures, which take a more holistic approach to addressing the root causes 
of systematic abuse and may be of benefit to larger groups of victims. What is 
important is the end result: individuals are protected. The CHR has itself stated that 
its success 'is measured by its ability to make a difference to the lives of 
indi~iduals'.''~ Also, the CHR and GA may be inappropriate forums to discuss and 
analyse cases of individual abuse. Due to time constraints, the composition of these 
bodies, and their deliberative nature, the CHR and GA are more appropriately 
concentrated on cases of large-scale abuse that are clear-cut and receive 
overwhelming condemnation. '" 
149 International Bill of Human Rights, GA Res 217 (111), UN GAOR, 3 1 ~  Session, 1948. 
150 For example, the Working Group on Enforce or Involuntary Disappearances is mandated to assess state conduct 
in light of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance: see United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, Question ofEnfoorced or Involzmtary Disappearances, Res 2001146, UN DOC 
E/CN.4/Res/200 1/46. 
151 See United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Question of Arbitrary Detention, Res 1997150, UN Doc 
ElCN.4/RESl1997/50 para 5. 
152 Allison L Jernow, 'Ad Hoc and Extra-Conventional Means for Human Rights Monitoring' (1996) 28 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 785,7 86. 
153 Newinan and Weissbrodt, above n 145,210. 
154 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights, 
<http:/lwww.unhchr.ch/htmllmenu2/21chrintro.htm~ at 5 July 2002. 
155 Weissbrodt and Bartolomei, above n 143, 1026- 103 1. 
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The principal weakness of these bodies derives from their political nature. The CHR 
and GA have not acted against all violating states. Van Boven comments that: 
[florceful and fully legitimate action of the United Nations with respect to the 
human rights situation in Chile is not followed by similar types of action of 
principal United Nations organs relating to 'Chile-like situations' in other countries 
of Latin America. Apartheid in South Afiica is rightly condemned with vigour but 
massacres committed in independent South African States are passed over in 
silence. It is no surprise that reproaches of selectivity, double standard, conspiracy 
of silence etc. are constantly in the air.156 
An examination of GA resolutions shows that fewer than thirty states have been 
subject to address by the GA for failure to observe human rights. Bayefsky points 
out that of the resolutions passed by the CHR, '[slixty percent.. . concerned only 
two states [presumably South Africa and Israel]. Omitted fiom the list entirely are 
states such as China and  ria'.'^^ Clearly, condemnation of states by those organs 
of the UN composed of governments is highly politicised. It has been pointed out 
that South Africa was subject to sustained attack in the GA because unlike other 
states with poor human rights records, it was not part of a large voting block in the 
UN, and was consequently unable to protect its own interests.158 
As to the effectiveness of these mechanisms, it is probably fair to conclude with a 
comment by Ramcharan, who states that 
[tlhrough the dialogue and contacts undertaken.. . the United Nations is able to 
bring an international presence to bear upon a situation; to assist governments to 
overcome difficulties they may be experiencing: to mitigate and possibly to 
contribute to improvement and change in a situation; perhaps to prevent violations 
from increasing and even reducing those violations; and to help in some individual 
cases.159 
A Institutional Structure 
Five of the United Nations-sponsored human rights treaties presently allow 
individuals to bring claims against violating states: the International Covenant on 
156 The0 van Boven, 'United Nations and Human Rights, A Critical Appraisal' in Cassese (ed), UN 
Law/Fundamental Rights: Two Topics in International Law (1 979) 1 19,127. 
157 Remarks by Anne Bayefsky in Janet Lord, 'Human Rights: Implementation Through the UN System' (1995) 89 
ASIL Proceedings 225,226; Morris Abram declares that '[a] glance at the Commission's agendas from the past 
twenty years reveals that the lion's share of its attention has been directed at three country targets: South Africa, 
Chile and Israel': Morris Abram, 'Appearance v Reality: The Treatment of Israel in the UN Commission on Human 
Rights and the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities', in Janet Lord, 
'Human Rights: Implementation Through the UN System' (1 995) 89 ASIL Proceedings 23 1,232. 
158 Denise Prevost, 'South Africa as an Illustration of the Development in International Human Rights Law' (1999) 
South Afiican Year Book of International Law 2 1 1,2 13. 
159 Bertrand Ramcharan, The Concept and Present Status of the International Protection of Human Rights: Forty 
Years After the Universal Declaration, (1989) 138. 
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Civil and Political fights (ICCPR),~'~ the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  CAT),'^' the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),'~~ 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
( c E D A w ) ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  the International Convention on the Protection of the fights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (cMw).'~~ Due to their 
similarities, they will be examined together. 
B Access 
All of the treaties require positive action by states that accept the jurisdiction of the 
relevant committee to receive individual petitions, either through a declaration 
under the main treaty or accession to a separate instrument.165 Only victims or their 
designated representatives may submit claims,166 and protection is limited to 
physical persons. 
Communications may be submitted in any language but decisions are issued only in 
the official languages of the UN.'" Proceedings will normally be written.169 Only 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the 
Committee Against Torture (CornrnAT) have made provision for oral hearings and 
160 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966,999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
opened for signature 16 December 1996,999 UNTS 17 1 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
161 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for 
signaturelo December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987). 
162 International Convention on the Elimination ofAl1 Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 2 1 
December 1965,660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969). 
'63 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 18 
December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13, art 22 (entered into force 3 September 198 1). 
1 64 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights ofAIl Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 
GA Res 451198, 1990, (entered into force 1 July 2003). 
165 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatmerzt or Punishment art 22; International Convention on the Elimination 
ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination art 14; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women, GA Res 5414, 1999; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families art 77. 
166 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art 1 ; International Convention on 
the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination art 14 (1); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art 22; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art 2; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families art 77(1). 
167 This is apparent from the texts of the treaties. 
168 Alfred de Zayas, 'Petitioning the United Nations' (2001) 95 ASIL Proceedings 82,84; Human Rights Committee, 
Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPRlCl3Rev.3 (1994) r 29; Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, UN Doc CERD/Cl35/ReV.3,01101/89 r 30; Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women in Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
Annex I, Af56138, r 26; The Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, UN Doc CAT/CI3/Rev.4., r 30. 
169 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art 5; Rules of Procedure of the 
Human Rights Committee r 9 1,93,94; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination article 14(6)(b); Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination r 
92(1), 94; Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women r 69(3), 69(4), 
69(5), 69(8); Rules of Procedure o f  the Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment r 109. 
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these are recent changes. They will probably not occur with great frequency given 
cost and time implications.170 Additional information may be requested from either 
party during the process,171 and the individual is able to reply to any information 
submitted by the state.172 While legal aid is not available, this may be balanced by 
the fact that proceedings will usually be written, and there is no requirement that the 
petitioner be assisted by legal c0unse1.l~~ 
C Remedies 
The case law of CERD and ComrnAT is relatively permitting a 
comprehensive review of the recommendations it makes. Neither the Commission 
on Migrant Workers nor the Commission on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (ComrnEDAW) have yet issued any views on cases. The caselaw 
of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) is far more prolific, and thus examination 
has been limited to a review of remedies in its annual report of 2001.175 A 
committee will on occasion declare a violation, without a recommendation for 
further a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  However, it will usually invite the state to take some form of 
action to: provide a particular judicial remedy at the domestic level (such as 
opening an investigation, prosecuting and punishing those responsible for 
violations, or creating a civil remedy); l 77 reform its legislation; ' 78 prevent similar 
violations in the future;'79 disseminate the Committee's views in an appropriate 
language;lS0 refrain from taking particular action (such as deportation);lS1 release 
victims;'82 guarantee the security of a v i~ t im; '~~or  reinstate the victim in a particular 
170 de Zayas, above n 168,85. 
171 Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee r 80,9 l(4); Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination r 92(1); Rules of Procedtire of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women r 58,69(8); Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment r 109,l l  l(4). 
172 Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee r 93 (3), 9 l(6); Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination r 94(4); Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women r 69(9); Rules of Procedure ofthe Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment r109(10). 
173 de Zayas, above n 168,84. 
174 To date, CERD has delivered 22 decisions, of which it appears only 5 contained findings of violations. 
CommAT has delivered 87 decisions, of which it appears only 18 contained findings of violations: see 
<http:l/www.unhchr.ch~tbsldoc.nsfi at 27 June 2002. 
175 The cases of the HRC are taken from Human Rights Committee, Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee 
2001, UN Doc A156140, vol I paras 167-1 74. Up to July 2000, the HRC had delivered 346 decisions on the merits: 
see Bayefsky, above n 160,506. 
176 See, eg, the decision of ComrnAT in Abad v Spain (1996) Comm. No. 5911996, UN Doc CAT/C/20/D/59/1996 
para 9. 
'77 See Blazek et al. v. Czech Republic (2001) Case No. 85711999, UN Doc CCPR~Cl72/Dl85711999; Mansaraj et 
al. v. Sierra Leone (2001) Case No. 83911998, UN Doc CCPR~CI72/D/83911998; LK v Netherlands (1991) 
Comm. No. 411991, CERD/C142/D1411991 para 6.8; Ristic v Yugoslavia (1998) Comm. No. 11311998, 
CAT/Cl26/Dl113/1998 para 9.6. 
178 See, eg, Blazek et al. v. Czech Republic (2001) Case No. 85711999, UN Doc CCPR/C/72/Dl857/1999 
179 Nedzibi v Austria (1991) Comm. No. 811991, UN Doc CATlCI1 l/D/8/1991 para 15. 
lso See, eg, Blazeket al. v. Czech Republic (2001) Case No. 85711999, UN Doc CCPR/Cl72/D/85711999. 
181 See, eg, Winata v. Australia (2001) Case No. 93012000, UN Doc CCPR/Cl72/Dl93012000. 
182 See, eg, Mansaruj et a/. v. Sierra Leone (2001) Case No. 83911998, UN Doc CCPWC/72/D/839/1998. 
183 See, eg, Chongwe v. Zambia (2000) Case No. 82111998, UN Doc CCPR/Cl70/D/821/1998. 
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post.184 Occasionally compensation185 or payments of legal costs are directed? 
Neither CommAT nor CERD have to date recommended the payment of legal costs 
by the state, and the HRC appears to do so only rarely. CommAT has not yet 
recommended compensation. The HRC can also be praised for its strength in 
allowing a complaint alleging that the views of the committee in respect of the same 
individual had not been complied with. ' 87 
The committees may request states to take interim measures.188 Their attitudes vary 
as to the binding nature of interim measures. CommAT has expressed its deep 
concern regarding a state's failure to follow interim measures, as such a failure may 
jeopardise its final decision.lS9 The HRC seems to indicate that failure to follow 
interim measures may violate the state's obligations. lgO 
The bodies issue 'views', 'suggestions', 'decisions' or  recommendation^'.'^^ States 
have not undertaken expressly to abide by these, and in this sense it may be said 
that the committees' pronouncements are non-binding. While this may be true in 
strict legal terms, both commentators and the HRC itself have expressed the view 
that that committee's recommendations do carry some weight. Chstian Tomuschat 
states that 
[llegally, the views formulated by the Human Rights Committee are not binding on 
the State party concerned which remains free to criticize them. Nonetheless, any 
State party will find it hard to reject such findings in so far as they are based on 
184 See, eg, Mazou v. Cameroon (2001) Case No. 63011995, UN Doc CCPR/Cl72/D/630/1995; Yilmaz Dogan v 
Netherlands (1 984) Comm. No. 111 984, CERD/C/36/D/1/1984 para 10. 
185 See, eg, Laptsevich v. Belarus (2000) Case No. 78011997, UN Doc CCPR/Cl68/D/780/1997; Habassi v 
Denmark (1997) Cornm. No. 1011997, UN Doc CERD/C/54/D/10/1997 para 11.2; 
186 See, eg, Laptsevich v. Belarus (2000), Case No. 78011997, UN Doc CCPR/C/68/D/780/1997. 
l X 7  Pinto v Trinidadand Tobago (1996) Case No. 51211992, UN Doc CCPR/Cl57/D/51211992, noted in Ineke 
Boerefijn, 'Follow-up of the Views of the United Nations Treaty Bodies' in Barkhuysen, Emmerik, Kempen (eds), 
The Execution of Strasbourg and Geneva Human Rights Decisions in the National Legal Order (1999) 101, 11 1- 
112. The European Court has refused to re-examine a previously decided case and note a continued or new 
violation: see Olsson v Sweden (no 2) (1992) 250 Eur Crt HR (ser A). 
188 Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee r 86; Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination r 94(3); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms 
ofDiscrimination Against Women art 5, Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women r 63; Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment r 1 lO(3). 
TPS v Canada (1997) Cornrn. No. 9911997, UN Doc CAT/C/24/D/99/1997 paras 15.6,15.7. ComrnAT 
reminded the State that it had accepted its obligations under the CAT voluntarily. See also Chipana v Venezuela 
(1998) Comrn. No. 11011998, UN Doc CATlC/D/110/1998 para 8. 
190 The HRC stated that executing a claimant whose case was pending, in breach of an interim order, was a 'grave 
breach' of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: United Nations, 
'Human Rights Commission on Complaints of Violations from Individuals' (Press Release, 4 September 2003) 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/hwicane/huricane.ns~view01~2D753B2B50A38C5C1256D970044C974?opendocumenP 
at 6 September 2003. 
191 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art 5(4); Rules of Procedure of the 
Human Rights Committee r 94(3); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment art 22(7); Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment r 112(4); International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial 
Discrimination art 14(7)(b); Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination r 
95(3); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women art 
7(3); Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination ofDiscrimination against Women r 72(5); 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights ofAll Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families art 
77(7). Interestingly, while CAT (art 22(7)) states that CornmAT will issue 'views', ComrnAT's Rules of Procedure 
(r 112(4)) state that it shall issue 'decisions'. 
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orderly proceedings during which the defendant party had ample opportunity to 
present its  submission^.'^^ 
Michael Steiner believes that the HRC 
has taken the position that absence of a provision in the Protocol describing views 
as 'binding' cannot mean that a state may freely choose whether or not to comply 
with them. Views carry a normative obligation for states to provide the stated 
remedies, an obligation that stems from the provisions of the Covenant and 
~rotoco1. l~~ 
The HRC's reasoning is as follows: 
Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party 
has recognised the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has 
been a violation of the Covenant or not and that, pursuant to article 2 of the 
Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the Covenant, and to 
provide an effective and enforceable remedy in case a violation has been 
established, the Committee wishes to receive from the State pa . . . information % about the measures taken to give effect to the Committee's Views. 
It seems reasonable to conclude from this statement that the HRC considers its 
views binding. 
D Compliance 
Some of the committees will follow-up the implementation of their views,195 and 
steps are being taken to establish a central follow-up procedure.196 The HRC 
includes information gathered through follow-up in its annual report. Between 1991 
and 2001 the HRC Special Rapporteur for follow-up views had received replies in 
respect of 198 views, with no reply in respect of 75 views. Many petitioners had 
also informed the HRC that recommendations had not been implemented, though 
'in rare instances, the author of a communication has informed the Committee that 
the State party had given effect to the Committee's recommendations, although the 
State party had not itself provided that inf~rmation'. '~~ The HRC further states that 
19* Christian Tomuschat, 'Evolving Procedural Rules: The United Nations Human Rights Committee's First Two 
Years of Dealing with Individual Communications' (1980) 1 Human Rights Law Journal 249,255. 
193 Michael Steiner, 'Individual Claims in a World of Mass Violations: What Role for the Human Rights 
Committee?' in Philip Alston and James Crawford (eds), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring 
(2000) 15,30. 
Sooklal v Trinidad and Tobago (2000) Comm No. 92812000, UN Doc CCPR~C/73/Dl92812000 para. 7; See also 
k'iivelaand ~ a k k d a ~ ~ r v i  v Finland (1997) Comm No. 77911997, UN Doc CCPR/C/731779/1997 paras 8.2-9; 
Simpson v Jamaica (1996) Comm No. 69511996, UN Doc CCPR/Cl73/D169511996 paras 9-10. 
195 Meeting of the Chairpersons of the Human Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Review of Recent Developments to the Work of the Treaty Bodies, Status of the Annual Appeal 2001,8 June 
2001, UN Doc HRVMCl200112 para 17. 
196 A result of the recommendations of the Thirteenth Meeting of Chairpersons on the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 
EflectiveJitnctioning of human rights mechanisms: treaty bodies, follow-up 6 June 2002, UN DOC HRIMCl200212 
para 25. 
19' United Nations Human Rights Committee, above n 25, paras 177-178. 
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[rloughly 30 per cent of the replies received could be considered satisfactory in that 
they display the State party's willingness to implement the Committee's views or 
to offer the applicant an appropriate remedy. Other replies cannot be considered 
satisfactory because they either do not address the Committee's recommendations 
at all or merely relate to one aspect of them. Certain replies simply indicate that the 
victim has failed to file a claim for compensation within statutory deadlines and 
that no compensation can therefore be paid to the victim.lP8 
Neither CommAT nor CERD include in their annual reports information on the 
degree of compliance with, or follow-up on, their recommendations. It may be 
sensible to assume that it would not differ significantly from that of the HRC.'" 
The follow-up process is facilitated by cooperation that has emerged between the 
Charter-based and treaty-based mechanisms dealing with individual c ~ m ~ l a i n t s ~ ~ ~  
although this does not yet appear to be systematic in nature and is constrained by 
limited reso~rces .~~'  The committee most active in this appears to be CommAT, 
followed by CornrnEDAW. The concluding observations of these bodies 
occasionally congratulate or exhort the state (as appropriate) regarding its response 
to the communications on individual cases sent by a particular rapporteur, and any 
invitation it has extended or failed to extend to them to conduct a visit.202 CommAT 
has also requested information from a state in its periodic report on action the state 
has taken to implement the recommendations of the Special Rapporteurs on 
~ o r t u r e . ~ ' ~  Similarly the HRC is noted on one occasion to have questioned a state 
delegation on what the state had done to give effect to the recommendations of an 
extra-treaty procedure.204 
The Committees submit an annual report to the Third Committee of the GA,~" 
which does not seem to use this as an opportunity to pressure particular states about 
their compliance with decisions on individual petitions. While it generally exhorts 
19' Ibid. 
199 During the 57h CHR deliberations on enhancing the effectiveness of the treaty bodies, the representative of 
Poland stated (but apparently without references) that '70 per cent of the States parties that had accepted a 
complaints mechanism had never been the subject of a complaint. In only 20 per cent of cases in which a violation 
had been disclosed had the State been willing to provide a remedy': Thirteenth Meeting of Chairpersons of the 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Informal Note on the Deliberations of the Commission on Human Rights at itsfifty- 
seventh Session on Agenda Item 18 (a), 7 May 2001, UN Doc HR1/MC/2001/Misc. 1 para 6. 
200 See, eg, Record of the Joint Meeting of the Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies and the Ninth 
Meeting of Special RapporteursRepresentatives, Experts and Chairpersons of Working Groups of the Special 
Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights, 24 May 2002, UN Doc HRVMC12002iMisc.3 paras 11-28. 
201 Implementation of Recommendations of the Second Joint Meeting of the Chairpersons and Special Mandate 
Holders, 8 June 2001, UN Doc HRI/MC/2001/Misc.3 para 16. 
202 See, eg, Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Concluding Observations (Indonesia), 22 November 2001, UN Doc CAT/C/XXVII/Concl.3 paras 9(h), lO(1); 
Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Concluding 
Observations (Cameroon), 6 December 2000, UN Doc A156144 para 63(b), 65(c); 
203 Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Concluding 
Observations (Brazil), UN Doc A156144 para 120(i). 
204 There appears to be no documented evidence of this apart from its mention in the record of the Joint Meeting of 
the Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies and the Ninth Meeting of Special 
RapporteursRepresentatives, Experts and Chairpersons of Working Groups of the Special Procedures of the 
Commission on Human Rights, 24 May 2002, UN Doc HRVMC12002iMisc.3 para 15. 
205 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art 45; International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination art 9(2); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment art 24; Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women art 
21. 
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states to 'take duly into account' the HRC's views under the Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR, it has failed to mention compliance with the decisions of ComrnAT or 
CERD.~'~ Committee representatives are not given an official role in the 
presentation of the report and may only appear as part of a state delegation.2o7 
While the GA does formulate resolutions with regard to particular states, often in 
strong terms, these are based almost invariably on information from SRs, WGs, and 
the CHR. In 2000 the GA addressed resolutions to Afghanistan, Haiti, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, the countries in the Balkans, Myanmar, and 
~ a m b o d i a . ~ ' ~  In its resolution on Iran, the GA referred to the information contained 
in the concluding observations of the HRC and CERD.~'~ In its resolution on 
Myanmar, the GA strongly urged the government to implement the 
recommendations of CommEDAW (which must have been a reference to its 
concluding observations, as CommEDAW has not issued any views on individual 
petitions).210 There does not appear to be any reference in GA resolutions to 
compliance with individual petitions under the treaties. 
E Comment 
The committees are able to deliver legally reasoned decisions, with 
recommendations for remedial action. These command great moral authority 
because states have expressly consented to them (through a declaration or 
ratification of a separate instrument), and they are arguably legally binding (see the 
statements of the HRC). Unlike the Charter procedures, the committees attempt to 
place the individual on an equal footing with states in the procedures they follow, 
allowing each the opportunity to respond to the other's claims. The individual's 
position would be further improved if there existed provision for legal aid and an 
increase in oral participation in hearings. While this may make issues easier to 
clarify, resources are not available. The relative informality of the procedures 
before the committees keeps the cost of an international application low. However, 
the applicant will still have to cover costs incurred while satisfying the preliminary 
requirement to exhaust local remedies. This consideration makes it desirable for the 
206 Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res 561143, UN GAOR, 56th 
Session, UN DOC A/Res/56/143; International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, GA Res 55181, UNGAOR, 55" Session, UN Doc A/Res/55/81. 
207 Follow-up, see paras. 3-5. 
208 Respectively: Question of Human Rights in Afghanistan, GA Res 5511 19, UN GAOR, 55" Session, UN Doc 
A/Res/55/119; Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, GA Res 5511 18, UN GAOR, 55th Session, UN Doc 
AfResl551118; Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, GA Res 5511 17, UN GAOR, 
55' Session, UN Doc A/Res/55/117; Situation ofHuman Rights in the Sudan, GA Res 5511 16, UN GAOR, 55th 
Session, UN Doc A/Res/55/116; Human Rights Situation in Iraq, GA Res 5511 15, UN GAOR, 55& Session, UN 
Doc A/Res/55/115; Situation ofHuman Rights in the Islamic Republic ofIran, GA Res 5511 14, UN GAOR, 55" 
Session, UN Doc A/Res/55/114; Situation of Human Rights in parts of South-Eastern Europe, GA Res 5511 13, UN 
GAOR, 55th Session, UN Doc A/Res/55/113; Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, GA Res 5511 12, UN GAOR, 
55' Session, UN Doc A/Res/55/112; Situation ofHuman Rights in Cambodia, GA Res 55/95, UN GAOR, 55th 
Session, UN Doc A/Res/55/95. 
209 Preamble to Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GA Res 5511 14, UN GAOR, 55" Session, 
UN Doc A/Res/55/114 para 6. 
210 Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, GA Res 5511 12, UN GAOR, 55" Session, UN Doc A/Res/55/112 para 
117. 
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committees to include recommendations for the state to pay legal costs in successful 
cases. Also, although it is encouraging to see the ease of accessibility of information 
regarding the committees on the internet, this is limited by an understanding of one 
of the UN's official languages as well as computer literacy and access to the 
internet. Overall the procedures of the committees are more favourable to 
individuals than those of the CHR. However, because the committees are part- 
time211 and lack resources, they have a growing backlog of cases.212 A claim under 
the treaty system will probably take longer to finalise than under the CHR, with 
compliance not guaranteed anyway. The greater problem is the absence of express 
state commitment to follow these views, and the lack of adequate supervision by the 
political bodies. 
The UN treaty bodies resemble the African and American Commissions in their 
proceedings (they are written), their remedies (because they direct a specific course 
of legislative or administrative action but are less likely to direct or less specific 
about the payment of costs or reparation), their enforcement mechanisms (because 
they have political bodies which fail to address specific states for their compliance 
with specific decisions), and their part-time nature.213 Both those UN Charter and 
UN treaty mechanisms which provide information on compliance seem to have a 
marginally higher success rate than the American system and a far greater success 
rate than the African system. 
The Charter-based mechanisms have the advantage of applying to all members of 
the UN without the need for prior consent. This is similar to the American 
Commission in respect of the DRM, although the Commission produces reasoned 
decisions and recommends remedial action. Clearly, from a procedural standpoint, 
an individual is better placed under the UN treaty system than the Charter-based 
system. However, the problem of the growing backlog means that to have one's 
case dealt with promptly it may be necessary to proceed where possible through the 
SRs and WGs. 
The American and African systems appear to be evolving in a similar direction to 
the European model in establishing courts - which the American system did not 
possess at the outset - and allowing the individual to participate independently of 
the commissions.214 The European model presently seems the most successful, in 
'I '  Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee r 2; Rules qfprocedure of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination r 1 ; Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment r 2. 
"2 With respect to the HRC, see the Thirteenth Meeting of Chairpersons on the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, above 
n 199, paras 21-22; see also the United Nations Human Rights Committee, above n 25, para 98; see also Steiner, 
above n 193,32-33. 
213 Evaluation of the Workings of the Inter-American System for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights with 
a View to its Improvement and Strengthening, OAS AG/RES 1828 (XXXI-010 l), 3 1 st Session paras 1 (c), 1 (a), 2(a); 
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples 'Rights r 2. 
214 See also Dinah Shelton, 'New Rules of Procedure for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' (2001) 
22 Human Rights Law Journal 169. 
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securing compliance with individual decisions and places the individual in the most 
favourable position. This is not to say that the European system is ideal, and it does 
not seem unreasonable to conclude that the Council of Europe has drawn on the 
experience of the other regional and global bodies' use of country reports in 
establishing the Commissioner on Human Rights. 
There are two major differences between the European system and the other 
systems. First, there is the effectiveness of the enforcement body that engages states 
on a case-by-case basis, and second, the full-time nature of the body. It is suggested 
that even if the other systems are reformed in these two respects the current 
problems will remain, as the real difficulty lies in the willingness of states to follow 
human rights norms in the first place, or to remedy violations after the event. This 
view, that the effectiveness of an international tribunal will depend on the existence 
of domestic pressure on the government, is also supported by Laurence Helfer and 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, who use the European Court and European Court of Justice 
as models for a theory of 'effective supranational adjudication'. 215 
It is questionable whether it would make a difference to the systems to have more 
specialised enforcement bodies like the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, which belongs to an organisation largely dedicated to promoting human 
rights.216 In the UN, it is the Third Committee of the GA which formulates 
resolutions on human rights. Although specialising in dealing with social, 
humanitarian and cultural issues, its enforcement is not particularly rigorous. 
Ultimately, compliance will depend on the will of both impugned states and those 
enforcing decisions rather than the nature of the body to which they belong. 
Indeed, that states should be expected or permitted to supervise themselves might 
seem altogether illogical. Their status as guardians of the very system designed to 
keep their power in check reflects the state-centred nature of international law. Yet 
perhaps it is appropriate because political power - and with it any prospect of 
enforcement -- lies with states. It may be sensible to conclude that compliance is 
always going to depend on the mood or attitude of the states involved. It is not that 
the European system is the ideal, but rather that as states become more open and 
accountable towards their own people, they appear to become less able to object to 
outside supervision of their human rights. In this vein, Dinah Shelton has noted that 
while to 
215 Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication' (1 997) 
107 Yale Law Journal 273,387: 
[Tlhe ECJ and the ECHR have exploited the opportunities granted them by the provision of 
supranational jurisdiction. They have built strong bridges to private litigants, creating a constituency for 
their judgments that is interested and able to pressure domestic government institutions to take heed and 
comply with those judgments. They also have forged direct relationships with different domestic 
institutions: The ECJ deliberately wooed national courts, and the ECHR earned support from courts, 
administrative agencies, and some national legislators. 
216 See CouncilofEurope,AnOvewiew, 
<http://www.coe.int~T~E/Communication~and~Research/Contactswiththeublic/About~Council~of~Erope/An_ 
overview/> at 6 September 2003. 
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some extent, the adoption of Protocol 11 by the Council of Europe influenced 
developments in the OAS.. . the democratization that took place in the Americas in 
the early 1990s was the most significant factor that stimulated consideration of new 
procedures to respond to a growing caseload [of the 
Most states in the European system do not commit gross and systematic violations 
of human rights (though note Russia with regard to Chechnya, or the Czech 
Republic with regard to the ~ o m a ) . ~ "  This may mean that states are willing to be 
forceful with each other in the Committee of Ministers because they do not need to 
benefit from a mutually protective silence. For example, Nsongurua Udombana 
points out that 
[slince the OAU has historically been led by Heads of States who have been 
responsible for massive human rights abuses, inter-state condemnation of 
violations was not likely in such a context.. . The bottom line generally has been: 
'Watch me kill my people and I will watch you kill yours.'219 
Likewise, in the American system, the Assembly has more frequently criticised the 
Commission for highlighting human rights violations than it has the violating states. 
Thus, supervision of compliance by states cannot be said to weaken the system per 
se. 
It is also questionable whether much difference would be made by having full-time 
rather than part-time bodies. Although the European Court has become full-time, 
partly to deal with its backlog of cases, 'the backlog has continued to grow'. 220 The 
European Court has compulsory jurisdiction over individuals in 44 states, which 
generated almost 30,000 registered claims in 2 0 0 2 . ~ ~ ~  The committees have a far 
greater reservoir of potential victims, numbering over 1.5 billion in over 100 states. 
Yet the committees currently register less than 100 cases each year - perhaps 
explained by unfamiliarity among potential applicants with their existence and 
workings.222 Each treaty body is capable of delivering only about 30 views per year 
and there is at present an estimated three year backlog.223 Even full-time bodies 
would not be able to deal with the potential number of claims. One suggestion 
might be that the solution lies at the national level, something which has been 
recognised by the The delays facing the European Court in issuing 
judgments have provoked a new protocol to the European Convention, permitting 
217 Dinah Shelton, above n 214, 169. 
218 Report of the European Commissioner for Human Rights on his visit to the Russian Federation (Chechnya and 
Ingushetia, 4th March 2003, CommDH (2003) 5; Report of the European Commissioner for Human Rights on his 
visit to the Czech Republic, lSh October 2003, ComrnDH(2003) 10. 
219 ~dombana, above n 93, 1216-12 17. 
220 Jean-Paul Costa, The European Court of Human Rights and its Recent Case Law, 38 Texas International Law 
Journal Special (2003), 455,456. 
"' See Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, Survey ofActivities (2002) 3 1 
<(http://www.echr.coe.intEng/EDocs/2002SURVEY.pd at 4 April 2004. 
222 Anne Bayefsky, The UNHuman Rights Treaty System, Universality at the Crossroads (2001) 108, I 11. 
223 Steiner, above n 193,32-33. 
224 Report of the Secretary General, Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change, 9 September 
2002, UN Doc A1571397: 'Building strong human rights institutions at the country level is what in the long run will 
ensure that human rights are protected and advanced in a sustained manner. The emplacement or enhancement of a 
national protection system in each country, reflecting international human rights norms, should therefore be a 
principal objective of the Organisation'. 
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the Court to 'screen out7 those cases where the applicant has not suffered 
'significant disadvantage' and which do not raise important issues of law.225 Figures 
indicate that this crisis is not due to a disproportionately high number of cases being 
brought in relation to the newer members of the Council of Europe, where domestic 
protection is perhaps weaker than among its older members. Long-term member 
states in fact generate as many applications as new ones.226 Thus, while it may be 
true that better national protection can avoid overburdening the international 
supervision mechanisms, models for national protection cannot be found among the 
member states of the Council of Europe. 
Although this paper addresses the strengths of the individual petition system, it 
should be remembered that individual petition should not exist for its own sake. 
Ultimately what is important is that individuals are protected. Individual petition is 
therefore of limited use where violations are widespread and systematic. In this 
circumstance, it makes more sense to address the underlying cause. The European 
system has been criticised in the past for the 'almost minute attention the 
Convention bodies devote to comparatively minor matters or "legal niceties"' and 
the absence of a mechanism to examine widespread violations.227 In a world where 
such violations are still common, the use of wider thematic and country reporting 
can perhaps better provide relief to larger groups of victims. 
Despite the practical difficulties associated with an individual bringing an 
international claim, it cannot be denied that the procedures discussed have serious 
legal implications for the position of the individual in international law. In 1928 the 
Permanent Court of International Justice stated that 'the very object of an 
international agreement, according to the intention of the contracting Parties, may 
be the adoption by the parties of some definite rules creating individual rights'. 228 
Hersch Lauterpacht interprets this as a 
resounding blow to the dogma of the impenetrable barrier separating individuals 
fi-om international law . . . no considerations of theory can prevent the individual 
fi-om becoming the subject of international rights if States so 
Lauterpacht points out that the 'existence of a right and the power to assert it by 
judicial process are not identi~al'.~" Where international law confers rights on 
225 Preliminary Draft Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms: see Interim Activity Report of the Steering Committee for Human Rights (2002), UN Doc 
CDDH(2002)026, Addendum I Final. See Appendix V regarding Article 35(3). 
226 During 2000-2002, the States with the highest number of applications lodged against them were: France 
(approximately 3000), Germany (approximately 1500), Italy (between 7000 and 10000, though most of these were 
repeat violations of Article 6), Poland (between 3000 and 4000), Romania (approximately 2000), Russia (between 
2000 and 4000), Turkey (between 1000 and 3000), Ukraine (between 1500 and 2500), and the United Kingdom 
(approximately 1500): see Council of Europe, above n 22 1,32-33. 
227 Peter Leuprecht, 'Symposium: International Human Rights at Fifty - Innovations In The European System Of 
Human Rights Protection: Is Enlargement Compatible With Reinforcement?' (1998) 8 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 3 13,3 17. 
228 Jurisdiction of the Courts ofDanzig [I9281 PCIJ (ser B) No 15, 17. 
229 Hersch Lauterpacht, 'The Subjects of the Law of Nations, Part 2' (1948) 64 L.Q.R. 97,98-99. 
230 Hersch Lauterpacht, 'The Subjects of the Law of Nations, Part 1' (1947) 63 L.Q.R. 438,445. 
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individuals, the absence of international machinery allowing them to bring 
international claims against states cannot prevent individuals being considered 
subjects of international law. It is argued that international law has taken a further 
step from this point in two respects. First, the multiplication of international 
procedures permitting individuals to bring claims against states. Second, the fact 
that these have developed through a level of state consent more apparent than real. 
Were such developments owed to express treaty provisions or the free consent of 
states they would be less remarkable. Bruno Sirnma's comment in relation to the 
Charter bodies holds true for the other mechanisms as well: 
[Dlecisive human rights bridgeheads in areas of formerly unfettered domestic 
jurisdiction of states.. . have been gained less by force of treaty-making than by.. . 
soft law processes on the modest hard-law basis of a few very general Charter 
provisions.231 
The American and Charter-based systems apply international standards in 
individual claims where there is no state consent other than to the founding treaty of 
an intergovernmental organisation, which made no discernible provision for such 
mechanisms. Those states wishing to join the European Union have been obliged to 
submit first to the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court, and the Ahcan 
Commission hears individual petitions where no such express power existed in the 
Afncan Charter. Additionally one can see human rights bodies expanding the 
participation of individuals in proceedings through the alteration of their rules of 
procedure. While not always freely given, 
acceptance by states of the individual petitions procedures, which have granted the 
individual the right to call states to account, confirm ... the position of the 
individual as a bearer of rights and as a subject of international 
23 1 Bruno Sirnma, 'A Hard Look at Soft Law' (1988) 82 American Society of International Law Proceedings 377, 
380. 
23' De Zayas, above n 168, 86. 
